These are not the occupations lawyers usually think of when the topic of non-compete enforcement comes up. We normally envision a dispute concerning the mobility of an executive sales manager, a software engineer, or a seasoned product developer.
But many employees in retail professions have to confront non-competes as well. The June 8 New York Times article, "Noncompete Clauses Increasingly Pop Up In Array of Jobs," addresses the ever-expanding use of non-compete agreements and its impact on mid-level professionals.
In fact, the illustration of the 19 year-old camp counselor bound to a non-compete in her summer employment agreement is ridiculous. The owner's justification for such a restriction is laughable:
"Our intellectual property is the training and fostering of our counselors, which makes for our unique environment. It's much like a tech firm with designers who developed chips."
Um, no it's not.
This type of reasoning would, of course, justify the use of non-compete clauses for any employee in any work environment. But the summer camp proprietor's comment illustrates the problem with an employee's ability to challenge the enforceability of that agreement. She would need to show the lack of a legitimate business interest worthy of protection. And the rub is this: that's awfully expensive to prove.
Business owners always will provide some rationale for why their business is unique or how it invests significantly in human capital. And these flimsy, self-serving assertions of a legitimate business interest often carry the day with judges who simply don't have the time to take a deeper dive into what exactly it is the employer is trying to protect. An employee trying to fence with her ex-employer on this issue is hamstrung by the cost of litigation.
The ubiquity now surrounding non-competes, particularly as they are applied to mid-level retail-oriented employees, ultimately could produce a boomerang effect. If non-competes become too widespread, policymakers will search for legislative solutions. Courts will question how the pervasive use of covenants squares with the widespread rule that they should protect only against unfair, not ordinary, competition.
There can, in fact, be too much of a good thing.
